describing the introduction of information technology? The reasons are very transparent, at least to an economist. Substitution does not require intervention in markets, since the appropriate incentives for investment are provided by the price signals that accompany the balance between demand and supply for IT equipment. Technical change, by contrast, requires intervention, since markets fail to provide adequate incentives to undertake IT investments. Some portion of the returns spill over to the fortunate third parties who benefit from the deployment of IT without undertaking investments in IT equipment or restructuring their own economic activities.
The goal of this paper is to provide new evidence on the substitution of IT for other types of capital and labor inputs in the U.S. economy. For this purpose we extend the pioneering analysis of
Stephen Oliner and Daniel Sichel (1994) and our own earlier work, reported in Dale Jorgenson and Kevin Stiroh (1995) . We focus on the massive substitution towards computers in both business and household sectors as the price of computers fell dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s. We show that, in response, profit-maximizing firms and utility-maximizing consumers substituted IT for other goods and services, replacing other types of equipment and economizing on the use of labor effort.
From 1990 to 1996 the acquisition price of IT equipment for investment fell 16.6% annually, while the price of computers for consumption fell even faster at 24.2% per year. This rapid price decline cuts two ways in determining the cost of deploying IT equipment. First, a fall in prices reduces the acquisition cost of IT equipment; second, the rate of decline itself adds to the cost of using this equipment. At first blush this appears to be another paradox. How can a rapid decline in the price of a computer make it cheaper to acquire a computer, but more expensive to use it? The resolution of this apparent paradox is that the cost of using a computer is different from the cost of acquiring it. The cost of using a computer is the annualized cost over the lifetime of the equipment, while the acquisition cost is the present value of these annualized costs. The annualized cost includes the foregone opportunity of waiting for an even cheaper computer.
The large decline in the annualized cost or rental price of computers has induced both firms and households to alter their spending patterns and accumulate increasingly less expensive computers. During the 1990s, computer services to firms and households grew by 20% per year, exceeding the growth of other inputs by a factor of ten! These results provide persuasive evidence that firms and households respond to relative price changes by substituting IT equipment for other goods and services.
The question that remains is whether the massive substitution of IT equipment for other inputs has been accompanied by technical change in the economic sense. For this purpose, it is necessary to use the tool devised by Solow (1957) , namely, the residual in economic growth to quantify spillovers. Solow showed that these spillovers appear as residual economic growth after the growth of all other inputs, including inputs of IT equipment, are taken into account. The Solow paradox arises from the fact that this residual has slowed considerably since 1973, precisely when IT investment has risen to new heights. This has generated a kind of Computer Cargo Cult among economists and economic historians, patiently awaiting a deluge of spillovers like those that supposedly accompanied earlier technological revolutions.
To address this issue, we summarize recent evidence on technical change, using this term in its precise, if counter-intuitive, economic meaning. Technical change also goes by the name of the growth of total factor productivity (TFP) or output per unit of factor input. There is little evidence for a revival of TFP growth in the 1990s. After accounting for both the quantity and the quality of capital and labor inputs, aggregate TFP growth was only 0.23% per year for 1990-96. This is slightly less than the annual average from 1973-90 of 0.34%. A flood of spillovers accompanying the massive deployment of IT equipment would be accompanied by an increase in TFP growth, not a decline.
We conclude that the story of the computer revolution is a one of relatively swift price decline, huge investment in IT equipment, and rapid substitution of this equipment for other inputs. Perhaps surprisingly, this technological revolution has not been accompanied by technical change in the economic sense of the term, since the returns have been captured by computer producers and their customers.
I. Measuring the Sources of Growth
Our analysis of the sources of economic growth employs the Laurits Christensen and Jorgenson (1973) framework to distinguish between output of investment and consumption goods and inputs of capital and labor services. The novel contribution of our paper is to quantify the importance of IT equipment as both an input into production by firms and as a form of consumption by households. This enables us to quantify the substitution of the services of IT equipment for other inputs and to measure the growth of TFP over the period 1948-96, beginning before the commercialization of computers and continuing through the present.
The aggregate production function describes how inputs of capital services K, consumers' durable services D, labor input L, and technology T, are used to create outputs of investment goods I, consumption goods and services C, and a flow of services from consumers' durable goods S:
(1)
In this framework, consumers' durables are treated symmetrically with investment goods, since the accumulated stock of investment goods provides a flow of capital services into production, while the accumulated stock of consumers' durables provides a flow of capital services into consumption. These services appear as both an input into the aggregate production function D and an output of production S.

To isolate the impact of computers we decompose Equation 1 as:
( 2) where a "c" subscript refers to the computer portion and a "n" subscript refers to the non-computer
portion. Equation (2) can be rewritten in terms of weighted averages of growth rates of inputs and outputs to obtain a growth accounting equation. Our analysis is limited to the private, domestic economy and we do not explicitly examine the role of computers in the government or rest of the world sectors.
A. Capital Services
We employ the model of capital as a factor of production summarized in Jorgenson (1996) . Capital services are proportional to the stocks of assets, including computers, but aggregation requires weighting the stocks by rental prices rather than acquisition prices for assets. The rental price for each asset incorporates the rate of return, the depreciation rate, and the rate of decline in the acquisition price. The rental prices employed in our analysis of economic growth also depend on features of the tax structure for capital income that enter into the annualized cost of deploying capital. The rental price equals the marginal product of capital for a profit-maximizing firm, so that firms substitute among inputs in response to changes in rental prices.
Given the large decline in the rental price of computers, the substitution of IT equipment for other inputs is an immediate implication of the model of capital as a factor of production.
BEA (1998) provides detailed investment data for 35 types of producers' durable goods, 22 types of non-residential structures, and 48 types of residential assets. The investment data include a breakdown of computer equipment into mainframe computers, personal computers, direct access storage devices, printers, terminals, tape drives, and storage devices beginning in 1958, when computers first appear as separate entity in the National Income and Product Accounts. We combine these six components into a single "computer" series, which serves as our data on the output of computers as investment goods. A central feature of BEA's estimates is that price indices for computers and peripheral equipment hold the quality of this equipment constant. (See Nadia Sadee (1996) for details.)
For each asset, including computers, we calculate capital stock by the perpetual inventory method, using depreciation rates from Barbara Fraumeni (1997) . This is a departure from our previous paper, where we utilized the cohort-and asset-specific retirement patterns developed by Oliner (1993) and subsequently incorporated into the official capital stock estimates by BEA. We found little difference between a detailed approach based on Oliner and a simplified approach that uses a geometric approximation like that employed for other assets by BEA. We therefore selected a geometric depreciation rate of 31.5%, which is the best geometric approximation to the Oliner-based retirement profiles reported in BEA (1998). We use a similar approach in estimating rental prices for all assets that comprise our aggregate of capital services K.
B. Services of Consumers' Durables
Consumers purchase non-durable consumption goods and services for consumption, but acquire consumers' durables in order to provide a flow of services. The treatment of consumers' durables by Christensen and Jorgenson (1973) is exactly parallel to that of capital goods. We impute the value of the services of consumers' durables on the basis of the rental price concept employed in our estimates of the services of investment goods. Consumers maximize utility by substituting among consumption goods and services in response to price changes. The decline in rental prices of IT equipment has resulted in a massive substitution of the services of this equipment for other goods and services by households.
BEA (1998) provides data on purchases of 13 types of consumer durable goods through 1996, including "computing equipment," which made its first appearance in 1979. This series serves as the measure of computer purchases in our consumption accounts. As before, we estimate stocks of IT equipment in the household sector using the perpetual inventory method and depreciation rates from Fraumeni (1997) . We employ BEA's constant-quality price index for computing equipment. The flows of consumption services from consumers' durable goods, including IT equipment, are aggregated to form an index of consumption services, D and S, using our estimates of rental prices for all types of durables.
II. Substitution toward Computers
Production costs are minimized when marginal rates of substitution between inputs in production are equal to input price ratios. Similarly, utility is maximized when marginal rates of substitution in consumption equal price ratios of consumer goods and services. Under standard assumptions of diminishing marginal products and decreasing utility, a fall in the price of an input or a consumption good will lead to substitution toward the relatively cheap input or consumption good. In adapting this framework to deal with IT equipment it is important to underline the fact that the appropriate prices for computer services are rental prices, which reflect the annualized cost of using the equipment.
As a consequence of the pioneering work of BEA, it is well known that the acquisition price of computers, holding quality constant, has fallen rapidly. In Table 1 we show that the price of computer investment fell 16.6% per year from 1990 to 1996 and the price of IT equipment to households fell 24.2%
annually. These dramatic decreases in the acquisition prices resulted in corresponding declines in the rental prices of the services of computer capital deployed by firms of 14.9% per year and the rental prices of computer services to households of 23.4% annually during the 1990s. By contrast the price of labor input increased 2.3% per year, while the price of the services of non-computer capital to firms rose by 3.6%
annually and the price of non-computer consumers' durables services to households rose at the annual rate of 2.3%.
In response to the rapid changes in relative prices, firms and households substituted the services of IT equipment for other goods and services. This required substantial investment in computers, as well as restructuring of both production and consumption activities to absorb the new equipment. The data we have presented in Table 1 provide persuasive evidence of massive substitution towards computers in both business and household sectors. While computer services were expanding dramatically from 1990-96, the output of the U.S. economy grew at only 2.4% per year and labor input increased 2.2%, bringing labor productivity growth almost to a standstill. Meanwhile, the growth in computer inputs exceeded the growth in other inputs a factor of ten! Note that we have substantially understated the impact of IT equipment, since we have focused specifically on computers and do not include closely related high technology products. For example, much telecommunications gear is indistinguishable from IT equipment.
Also, computers and semi-conductors are now routinely embedded in automobiles and machinery, but we exclude these intermediate inputs from the aggregate production function. Stiroh (1998) has extended the sectoral model of production of Jorgenson, Frank Gollop and Fraumeni (1987) to encompass computers. At the sectoral level gross output rather than value added is the appropriate measure of output and intermediate goods are treated symmetrically with primary inputs. It is crucial to price intermediate inputs correctly in order to measure sectoral productivity growth. Triplett (1996) shows that this is a critical issue in measuring the growth of productivity in the computer and semi-conductor sectors. (See Stiroh (1998) for sectoral estimates of productivity and Robert McGuckin and Stiroh (1998) for further discussion.)
III. The Sources of U.S. Growth
In Equation 2 we have combined data on investment goods, consumption goods, capital services, services of consumers' durables, and labor services in order to analyze the sources of economic growth.
Growth in output is a share-weighted average of growth rates of various types of output or, equivalently, the sum of a share-weighted average of growth rates of inputs and the TFP residual. Table 2 reports estimates of the sources of growth for the U.S. private domestic economy for 1948-96, broken into three sub-periods -1948-73, 1973-90, 1990-96 . For the period 1948-96 output grew 3.4% per year. Capital services were the most important source of growth, accounting for 43% of the total, while labor accounted for 32% and the TFP residual the remaining 25%. The growth of output and TFP slowed sharply after 1973 and there has been another, smaller, decline since 1990.
The growth rate of output for 1990-96 was 2.4% per year, almost half a percentage point less than the average from 1973-90 of 2.9% annually. By contrast, the growth rate from 1948-1973 of 4.0% per year was a percentage point greater. This contrast between growth rates before and after 1973 has been generated a voluminous literature. The literature on the computer revolution, postulating an increase in growth rates of output and TFP that is yet to be observed, is still expanding rapidly, aided by new media such as the World Wide Web. This expansion has not been measurably slowed by the inconsistency between the basic thesis and the facts we have presented in Table 2 .
Although the TFP residual decelerated slightly in the 1990's, the picture for TFP growth is subtly different from the growth of output. Most of the slowdown in output growth after 1973 can be attributed to a collapse in TFP growth, but the smaller decline of half a percent per year in output growth after 1990 is primarily due to a decline in the growth of capital inputs. The contribution of labor input growth actually increased, while the contributions of capital services growth in the business and household sectors fell, even with rapidly rising contributions from IT equipment services. After accounting for the quality and quantity of labor and capital inputs, only 10% of aggregate growth remains unexplained by substitution among inputs and must be attributed to the residual. (These TFP estimates are consistent with the estimates of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1998), which reports that TFP growth fell from 2.1% per year for 1948-73 to 0.3% for 1973-90, and 0.3% for 1990-96.) We can break out the contribution of the three types of computer outputs -investment, consumption purchases, and consumption services -and combine all other outputs into a single index of "Non-Computer
Outputs." The data show that computers are most important as an investment good, contributing 0.26 percentage points to growth for 1990-96. Purchases of computing equipment by households and the service flow from this equipment contributed an additional 0.13 percentage points to growth, about half as much.
Although computers contributed virtually nothing to growth prior to 1973, nearly one-sixth of the 2.4% output growth for 1990-96 can be attributed to computer outputs.
Alternatively, we can express output growth as the sum of the contributions of the growth of capital services, consumers' durable services, labor inputs, and the TFP residual. The contributions of capital and consumers' durables can be decomposed into computer and non-computer components. In the 1990s computers were responsible for nearly 20% of the contribution of capital inputs to growth and 14% of the contribution of consumers' durables services. Taken together, computer inputs contributed 0.16 percentage points to output growth of 2.4% per year for 1990-96. These sources of growth are a direct consequence of substitution towards relatively cheap computers.
The resolution of the Solow paradox is that that computer-related spillovers, increasing returns in the production and use of computers, and network effects are fundamentally changing the U.S. economy. However, they are not ushering in a period of faster growth of output and total factor productivity. Rather, returns to investment in IT equipment have been successfully internalized by computer producers and computer users. These economic agents are reaping extraordinary rewards for mobilizing investment resources and restructuring economic activities. The rewards are large because of the swift pace technical change in the production of computers and the rapid deployment of IT equipment through substitution, not because of spillovers to third parties standing on the sidelines of the computer revolution. All values are are average, annual percentages. 
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